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Abstract—We give an explicit, general construction for opti-
mistic multi-party contract signing protocols. Our construction
converts a sequence over any finite set of signers into a protocol
specification for the signers. The inevitable trusted third party’s
role specification and computations are independent of the
signer’s role specification. This permits a wide variety of
protocols to be handled equally by the trusted third party.
We give tight conditions under which the resulting protocols
satisfy fairness and timeliness. We provide examples of several
classes of protocols and we discuss lower bounds for the
complexity of fair protocols, both in terms of bandwidth and
minimum number of messages.
Our results highlight the connection between optimistic fair
contract signing protocols and the combinatorial problem of
constructing sequences which contain all permutations of a
set as subsequences. This connection is stronger than was
previously realized.
I. INTRODUCTION
Alice would like to take a trip around the world, but
she only has a limited budget. She needs to book hotels,
transportation, and event tickets with a long list of indepen-
dent companies. The cheapest offers are non-refundable and
are available for a limited time only. Thus, once Alice has
collected all offers, she would like to either book all of them
at once or none of them at all.
A solution for Alice is to sign one single contract with
all companies she would like to buy a service from. She
could do this by carrying out a multi-party contract signing
(MPCS) protocol. The MPCS protocol would need to be fair
to ensure that either all signing parties eventually obtain
a signed contract or none of the parties do. This would
guarantee that either all or none of Alice’s bookings are
made. The protocol would also have to satisfy a timeliness
property to prevent the case where Alice or any other signing
partner is left in limbo waiting endlessly for the other parties
to sign the contract. Finally, the signing partners might be
interested in an abuse-freeness property which would ensure
that Alice cannot bargain with competing companies by
proving that she has the choice of canceling the offers or
obtaining them by signing the contract.
A practical solution to a scenario such as the one depicted
above is provided by the class of deterministic, asynchronous
MPCS protocols. As opposed to randomized protocols,
this class avoids the requirement of approximately equal
computational powers of signers. This class also assumes
a more realistic network model than protocols relying on
some degree of synchrony in the communication. Determin-
istic, asynchronous MPCS protocols do, however, require
a trusted third party (TTP). We therefore find the subclass
of optimistic MPCS protocols to be the most useful one,
because protocols in this class only involve the TTP when
a failure occurs during the course of the signing protocol.
Since it is very likely that Alice and the companies would
need to have digital credentials registered with an authority
in order to execute MPCS protocols, we may assume that
such an authority could also play the role of the TTP.
Thus, we consider in this paper the class of deterministic,
asynchronous, and optimistic MPCS protocols. Such proto-
cols consist in general of two sub-protocols — the main
sub-protocol executed by the signers and not involving the
TTP, and a resolve sub-protocol to be called only in case of a
failure in the main sub-protocol and to be executed between
a signer and the TTP.
Existing fair MPCS protocols of all flavors have a rigid
protocol structure. They consist of a number of rounds in
which the signers exchange promises to sign a pre-agreed
contract, followed by a round in which the actual signatures
on the contract are exchanged. These protocols are nearly
symmetric in the computation and communication complex-
ity of signer roles, regardless of the signers’ computational
resources and communication bandwidth.
In this paper, we show how to construct fair MPCS
protocols which can be adapted to specific conditions regard-
ing bandwidth and computational resources of individual
signers. A salient feature of our construction is that the
TTP’s protocol role and decision procedure remains the
same, regardless of the number of signers or shape of the
constructed protocol.
In particular, we show how to construct fair MPCS proto-
cols with an arbitrary number of signers in which a particular
signer needs to be active only twice in the protocol: once
to send a promise to every signer and the other time to
send a signature to every signer. This flexibility of protocol
structure and ease of protocol generation is interesting when
MPCS protocols are executed by signers with vastly different
resources, such as dedicated, commercial signing servers and
smart phones.
The input to our construction algorithm is a signing se-
quence [1], that is, a sequence indicating the order in which
the signers become active in the protocol execution. By
feeding the construction algorithm with signing sequences
which satisfy a simple combinatorial property, we obtain
fair MPCS protocols.
Contribution: We present a protocol compiler (Algo-
rithm 1) to convert a signing sequence into an MPCS
protocol. We prove that fair signing sequences produce
fair MPCS protocols (Theorem 3) and we give a simple
decision procedure to verify fairness of signing sequences
(Theorem 1). Our achievements are generalizations and
converses of the results of [1] as discussed in related work
below.
We explain how fair signing sequences and consequently
fair MPCS protocols can be constructed and give explicit
examples. We discuss the complexity of the resulting proto-
cols and pose the problem of finding fair MPCS protocols
requiring minimum overall communication bandwidth.
We believe that our construction produces abuse-free
protocols, but we do not analyze our protocols with respect
to that property in this paper.
Finally, we consider our proofs of fairness to be an
interesting starting point for employing a theorem proving
tool to automatically prove fairness of similar protocol
constructions with an arbitrary, finite number of protocol
roles.
Related Work: Multi-party contract signing protocols are
a particular instance of a fair and secure computation.
A detailed review of existing work on fairness in secure
computation protocols in general, but excluding optimistic
protocols, can be found in Gordon’s thesis [2]. Optimistic
fair exchange protocols, which include optimistic MPCS
protocols, are discussed in Asokan’s thesis [3].
The present paper deals with optimistic MPCS protocols
in an asynchronous communication model. It builds on a
line of work which includes Garay et al. [4] introducing
the abuse-freeness property and private contract signatures,
Mukhamedov and Ryan [5] developing the notion of abort
chaining attacks, and Mauw et al. [1] relating fairness of
MPCS protocols to a combinatorial property of signing
sequences.
Garay and MacKenzie [6] have designed MPCS protocols
which were later shown by Chadha et al. [7], using the model
checker Mocha, to not satisfy fairness in case of four or
more signers. Chadha et al. revised the resolve subprotocol
of Garay and MacKenzie. Mukhamedov and Ryan [5] have
shown that the revised version does not satisfy fairness in
case of more than five signers and introduce a new optimistic
MPCS protocol. They proved fairness for their protocol by
hand and used the NuSMV model checker to verify the case
of five signers. Zhang et al. [8] have used the model checker
Mocha in order to analyze the protocol of Mukhamedov and
Ryan for up to five signers. The analysis did not reveal any
flaws.
Mauw et al. [1] used the notion of abort chaining to derive
a lower bound on the number of messages necessary to
achieve fairness in MPCS protocols. It was shown that abort
chaining attacks are possible whenever the signing sequence
of the protocol satisfies the following combinatorial property.
The sequence does not contain all permutations of the set
of signers as subsequences when one regards only those
subsequences that start at or after the position of the last
signer to appear for the first time in the sequence. Signing
sequences satisfying this combinatorial property are said to
be unfair. Thus, it was shown that protocols giving rise
to signing sequences which are unfair suffer from abort-
chaining attacks.
It was neither shown nor claimed, however, that fair
signing sequences give rise to fair MPCS protocols. In fact,
it is not clear a priori whether abort-chaining attacks are the
only possible attacks on fairness. The present work proves
that this is indeed the case. Thus the present work provides
a converse result to [1].
An attempt to construct a fair MPCS protocol from one
particular fair signing sequence was already made in [1].
This protocol was verified by Zhang et al. [8] with the
model checker Mocha, which revealed that one protocol
message was missing a private contract signature and thus
the protocol was not fair in spite of giving rise to a fair
signing sequence. Zhang et al. have constructed fair three
and four-party MPCS protocols from a variety of signing
sequences. In [9], Zhang et al. extend their previous work
by model checking abuse-freeness properties and giving a
procedure for constructing MPCS protocols from signing
sequences. Their construction of the main protocol is related
to the one presented in this paper, but less general, and their
construction of the resolve protocol is different from ours.
An independent family of asynchronous MPCS protocols
was developed by Baum-Waidner and Waidner [10] and
verified using the model checker Mocha by Chadha et al. [7]
for two up to five signers. Baum-Waidner [11] improved the
complexity of the protocol for the case when fewer than half
of the participating signers are dishonest.
Paper structure: We introduce the notation used in this
paper, our assumptions and background information on
MPCS protocols, private contract signatures, and signing
sequences in Section II. We describe how to generate an
MPCS protocol from a signing sequence in Section III and
prove that fair signing sequences produce fair MPCS proto-
cols in Section IV. We illustrate our results by applying the
approach described in this paper to known and novel MPCS
protocols in Section V. The complexity of the protocols
obtained using our approach is analyzed in Section VI.
We briefly discuss in Section VII how to generalize our
construction to the case where fewer dishonest signers are
tolerated in exchange for shorter protocols.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Notation and Assumptions
Let N = {1, 2, 3, . . .} be the set of positive integers. We
write [n] for the set {i ∈ N | i ≤ n}.
Let A be a finite set. A finite sequence σ over A of length
n ∈ N is a function σ : [n] → A. We will write |σ| for the
length of σ and we will denote the elements in the image of
σ by σi instead of σ(i). To list all elements of σ, we will
write σ = (σ1, . . . , σn), where n = |σ|. Furthermore, we
will write ǫ for the empty sequence, that is the sequence with
no elements, and define the length of the empty sequence
to be 0. If σ1, σ2, . . . , σj are sequences over A, we will
write (σ1, . . . , σj) for the concatenation of the sequences.
We denote by A∗ the set of all finite sequences over A.
A sequence ρ is called a subsequence of σ, if there is a
strictly increasing function f : [|ρ|] → [|σ|], such that ρi =
σf(i). Thus, ρ is a subsequence of σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) if ρ
can be obtained by erasing zero or more symbols from σ.
If X is a finite subset of N, we write maxX and minX ,
respectively, for the largest and smallest element of X . We
define max ∅ = 0 and min ∅ =∞.
We assume that the communication between signers is
asynchronous and messages can get lost or be delayed ar-
bitrary long. For ease of exposition, we assume confidential
and authentic channels between all protocol participants.
The communication channels between signers and the TTP
are furthermore assumed to be resilient, which means that
the messages sent over these channels are guaranteed to be
delivered eventually and without modifications.
B. Optimistic Contract Signing Protocols
The goal of a contract-signing protocol is for all signers
to issue a universally verifiable signature on a pre-agreed
contract and for every signer to obtain a fully signed con-
tract. A fully signed contract is a set consisting of every
signer’s universally verifiable signature.
An optimistic contract signing protocol has the property
that in case of a failure or dispute in the course of the
protocol execution, a TTP can be contacted to recover from
the failure or resolve the dispute. Optimistic contract signing
protocols therefore typically consist of two subprotocols.
The main protocol is to be executed by the signers only,
while the resolve protocol is used to contact the TTP.
In this paper, a signer is said to be honest if he follows the
protocol specification faithfully and quits the main protocol
when executing the resolve protocol.
A common structure for the main contract signing proto-
col is for the signers to exchange promises to sign the con-
tract. Once sufficiently many promises have been exchanged,
the signers proceed to send universally verifiable signatures
to each other. In case of dispute, the promises received by
signers serve as evidence for the TTP to decide on how to
resolve the dispute.
Contract-signing protocols are expected to satisfy fairness
and timeliness. We define fairness and timeliness of opti-
mistic MPCS protocols as follows. The definitions are based
on [5].
Definition 1. An optimistic MPCS protocol for contract m
and finite set of signers A is said to be fair for an honest
signer P ∈ A, if whenever some signer Q ∈ A, Q 6= P ,
obtains a universally verifiable signature on m from P , then
P can obtain a universally verifiable signature on m from
R, for all R ∈ A.
It follows from Definition 1 that if an MPCS protocol over
a set of signers A is fair for all signers from A, then either
all honest signers obtain (with the TTP’s help if necessary) a
fully signed contract, or no signer obtains any honest signer’s
universally verifiable signature on the contract.
Definition 2. An optimistic MPCS protocol is said to satisfy
timeliness, if each signer has a recourse to stop endless
waiting for expected messages.
In optimistic protocols and with the assumption stated in
Section II-A, timeliness can be achieved by being able to
contact the TTP at any time using the resolve protocol and
by requiring the TTP to immediately respond to requests
from signers.
A further desirable property for MPCS protocols is abuse-
freeness which was introduced in [4]. We give the formal
definition of [6].
Definition 3. An optimistic MPCS protocol is said to be
abuse-free, if it is impossible for any set of signers at any
point in the protocol to be able to prove to an outside
party that they have the power to terminate or successfully
complete the contract signing.
In order to guarantee abuse freeness in an MPCS protocol,
a cryptographic primitive called private contract signature
was developed [4]. A private contract signature is a type
of digital signature which can be verified by a desig-
nated verifier and a designated TTP and converted into a
universally verifiable signature by the signer or the TTP.
Although private contract signatures are not necessary for
our construction of fair MPCS protocols, we use them in
order to be able to analyze our solution with respect to the
abuse-freeness property in future work.
Let P,Q be signers and T be the trusted third party.
The following definition recalls the main features of private
contract signatures. It uses notation from [5]. For a formal
definition of private contract signatures, we refer to [4].
Definition 4. A private contract signature by P for Q on
text t with respect to T , denoted by PCSP (t, Q, T ), is a
cryptographic object with the following properties:
1) PCSP (t, Q, T ) can only be created by P . Signer Q
can simulate the creation of PCSP (t, Q, T ).
2) T , P and Q, but no one else, can tell the difference
between the versions created by P or Q.
3) T and P , and no one else, can convert PCSP (t, Q, T )
into a universally verifiable signature, denoted by
SP (t).
The private contract signature PCSP (t, Q, T ) is used
by P to promise to Q to sign the text t. Upon receiv-
ing PCSP (t, Q, T ), Q can convince himself that P has
promised to sign t. Q cannot, however, use this promise
to convince anybody else about this fact. Moreover, P and
Q know in advance that T (as well as P ) is able to convert
PCSP (t, Q, T ) into a universally verifiable signature SP (t).
C. Signing sequences
Signing sequences were introduced in [1] as a simplified
representation of MPCS protocols. A signing sequence in-
dicates the order in which the signers become active in the
MPCS protocol execution.
Definition 5. A finite sequence over a finite set A is said to
be complete over A, if it contains every permutation of the
elements of A as a subsequence.
For instance, the sequence (a, b, c, a, b, c) is not complete
overA = {a, b, c}, because it lacks the subsequence (c, b, a),
while the sequence (a, b, c, a, b, c, a) is complete over A.
Given a sequence σ, a subset SigSet ⊂ [|σ|] will be
called a signing set for σ. It will be used to indicate the
positions in σ in which signers will issue signatures on a
contract rather than promises.
The following definitions and theorem are based on [1],
but are more general than their counterparts in that the
signing set allows for a greater set of sequences to be called
signing sequences.
Definition 6. Let σ be a sequence over a finite set A. Then
σ is called a signing sequence if there exists a signing set
SigSet such that the following conditions are satisfied.
1) The prefix of length |A| of σ is a permutation of A:{
σ1, . . . , σ|A|
}
= A.
2) The signing set refers to all elements in A:
{σi | i ∈ SigSet} = A.
3) The signing set satisfies the monotonicity condition
(i ∈ SigSet ∧ j > i)⇒ (j ∈ SigSet ∨ σj 6= σi).
A signing set SigSet satisfying the conditions above is
said to be proper.
Example 1. The sequence (a, b, c, b, a, c) over {a, b, c}
is a signing sequence. The initial permutation is (a, b, c)
and proper signing sets for this sequence are supersets of
{4, 5, 6}.
Definition 7. Let σ be a signing sequence over a finite
set A of length n with proper signing set SigSet. Let
l ≤ |A| and let f : [l] → [n] be a function. A subse-
quence (σf(1), . . . σf(l)) of σ is called an abort-chaining
subsequence (AC subsequence for short) if the following
holds:
1) ∀p6=q σf(p) 6= σf(q);
2) f(1) < |A|;
3) f(l) ∈ SigSet;
4) ∀p σf(p) 6∈
⋃
f(p)<j<f(p+1) {σj}.
AC subsequences are a translation of abort-chaining at-
tacks [5] to signing sequences.
Definition 8. A signing sequence σ with proper signing set
SigSet which has an AC subsequence is called unfair. A
signing sequence which is not unfair is called fair.
Example 2. The signing sequence (a, b, a, b) with signing
set {3, 4} is fair, since neither of the two possible sub-
sequences (a, b) and (b, a) can satisfy all four conditions
of Definition 7.
The sequence (a, b, a) with signing set {2, 3}, however, is
unfair, as the AC subsequence (a, b) shows.
The three preceding definitions can be specialized to the
definitions in [1] by requiring that a signing sequence has
length at least 2 |A| and that the signing set is equal to
SigSet = {|σ| − |A|+ 1, . . . , |σ|}. In this restricted setting,
it was shown in [1] that optimistic contract signing protocols
which give rise to an unfair signing sequence do not satisfy
fairness. Our generalized setting together with the following
theorem allows to easily extend those results to a wider class
of protocols.
Our main goal in this work, however, is to show the
converse to the result stated above: Every fair signing
sequence gives rise to a fair optimistic contract signing
protocol with our explicit construction. We will use the
following theorem to construct fair signing sequences. A
less general version of this theorem was proved in [1].
Theorem 1. Let σ be a signing sequence over a finite set
A with proper signing set SigSet. For each c ∈ A, let
l(c) = min {j ∈ SigSet | σj = c}.
The sequence σ with signing set SigSet is fair if and
only if for every c ∈ A the sequence σc = (σ|A|, . . . , σl(c))
is complete over A \ {c}.
Proof: Assume σ is fair. Suppose towards a contra-
diction that ρ is a permutation of A \ {c} which is not
a subsequence of σc. Then by Lemma 1 below, ρ can be
transformed into an AC subsequence of σ contradicting
fairness of σ.
Conversely, assume that for all c ∈ A, σc is complete
over A \ {c} and suppose towards a contradiction that s =
(σf(1), . . . , σf(η)) is an AC subsequence of σ. It follows that
f(η) ≥ l(c). Let c = σf(η). We may assume without loss
of generality that f(2) ≥ |A| and f(η − 1) < l(c) (else
we would consider a shorter AC subsequence). Since σc
contains all permutations of A\ {c} as a subsequence and c
is the last element of σc, it must contain s as a subsequence.
Thus, σ must contain (σg(1), . . . , σg(η)) as a subsequence,
where g is an increasing function such that g(1) ≥ |A| and
g(η) ≤ l(c).
By condition 4 of Definition 7, it follows that g(i) ≤ f(i)
or g(i) > f(i + 1) for i = 1, . . . , η − 1. However, since
(σg(1), . . . , σg(η)) is a subsequence of σ
c, it follows that
g(1) ≥ |A| > f(1), thus g(1) > f(2). Since g(i + 1) >
g(i), it follows inductively that g(i) > f(i + 1) for i =
1, . . . , η−1. This implies that g(η) > g(η−1) > f(η) which
is a contradiction, since it implies g(η) > f(η) ≥ l(c), but
g(η) ≤ l(c).
The following lemma is used in the proof of Theorem 1.
Lemma 1. A signing sequence σ has an AC subsequence if
there is a permutation ρ = (ρ1, . . . , ρ|A|) of A such that ρ
is not a subsequence of σc for c = ρ|A| and σ
c as defined
in Theorem 1.
Proof: We construct an AC subsequence
(σf(j−1), . . . , σf(|A|)) of σ by computing its indices
f(j − 1), . . . , f(|A|) backwards, starting from f(|A|).
Let f(|A|) = l(c), thus ρ|A| = σf(|A|) = c.
Consider the longest suffix (ρj , ρj+1, . . . , ρ|A|) of ρ which
is a subsequence of σc. (Since ρ itself is not a subsequence
of σc, it follows that j > 1.)
Let f(j), . . . , f(|A|) be an increasing sequence such that
for all i with j ≤ i < |A|
f(i) = max {ι | ι < f(i+ 1), σι = ρi} . (1)
Such a sequence exists, because (ρj , ρj+1, . . . , ρ|A|) is a
subsequence of σc.
Since (ρj , ρj+1, . . . , ρ|A|) is the longest possible subse-
quence and σ is a signing sequence, it follows that there
exists f(j − 1) < |A| with σf(j−1) = ρj−1. (Recall that the
first |A| elements of σ are a permutation of A.)
We show that (σf(j−1), . . . , σf(|A|)) is an AC sequence
of σ by verifying all conditions of the Definition 7:
• Condition 1 is satisfied since ρ is a permutation.
• Condition 2 is satisfied since f(j − 1) < |A|.
• Condition 3 is satisfied since f(|A|) = l(c).
• Condition 4 is satisfied by equation (1).
III. PROTOCOL COMPILER
In this section we present a protocol compiler, which for
every signing sequence over a set of signers A produces an
MPCS protocol consisting of a main protocol to be executed
by signers from A and a resolve protocol for the trusted third
party. The construction of the main protocol is presented
is Section III-A and the resolve protocol is explained in
Section III-B.
Let σ = (σ1, σ2, . . . , σn) be a sequence over a set A. We
define the leftmost permutation indexes of σ, denoted by
lmpi(σ), to be the set of positions where distinct elements
appear for the first time in σ. Formally, lmpi : A∗ → P(N)
is defined recursively as follows. Set lmpi(ǫ) = ∅. Then
lmpi(σ1, . . . , σl)
=
{
lmpi(σ1, . . . , σl−1) if σl ∈ {σ1, . . . , σl−1}
lmpi(σ1, . . . , σl−1) ∪ {l} else.
Furthermore, we denote by σ¯ the reverse sequence of σ,
i.e. σ¯ = (σn, σn−1, . . . , σ1). Note that (σ¯)i = σn−i+1. We
define the rightmost permutation indexes of σ by rmpi(σ) =
{i ∈ N | |σ| − i+ 1 ∈ lmpi(σ¯)}. The rightmost permutation
indexes indicate the position of last appearance of every
element in σ.
Example 3. Let σ = (a, b, a, c, a) be a sequence over
A = {a, b, c}. We have lmpi(a, b, a, c, a) = {1, 2, 4}, as
a, b and c appear in σ for the first time in positions 1, 2 and
4. Furthermore, σ¯ = (a, c, a, b, a) and rmpi(a, b, a, c, a) =
{2, 4, 5}.
We use prevσ(i) and nextσ(i) to refer, respectively, to
the previous and subsequent position of an element σi in σ.
Let i ∈ [|σ|]. We define
Bσ(i) = {j ∈ [|σ|] | j < i, σj = σi}
prevσ(i) =
{
maxBσ(i) if Bσ(i) 6= ∅,
0 else.
Analogously,
Aσ(i) = {j ∈ [|σ|] | j > i, σj = σi}
nextσ(i) =
{
minAσ(i) if Aσ(i) 6= ∅,
|σ|+ 1 else.
For ease of reading, we will leave out the subscript σ in
prevσ and nextσ whenever there is no confusion over which
sequence the functions apply to.
In this paper we usem to denote a contract and we assume
that m contains the contract text, the set A of involved
signers, the corresponding signing sequence σ, and signing
set SigSet.
A. Main protocol
Let σ = (σ1, σ2, . . . , σn) be a signing sequence over a
finite set A of signers. We present an algorithm which pro-
duces an MPCS protocol specification from such a sequence.
The protocol specification will consist of n steps, where the
i-th step of the protocol corresponds to the actions specified
for the signer σi in the signing sequence.
The simplest manner, in which a sequence could be turned
into a signing protocol, is to require that in the i-th step, a
signer σi waits until he receives a message from every signer
which has been active prior to the i-th step in the protocol.
Then σi sends a message to every other signer participating
in the protocol. This would lead to redundancies, since
between two appearances of a particular signer, there could
be multiple appearances of other signers. Thus, to reduce the
communication complexity, we will only require that each
signer receives a message from the last appearance of all
other signers. This is illustrated in Figure 1. The figure shows
the messages expected to be received and the messages to
be sent by a signer in a particular sequence.
a b c b d a d b c
Figure 1. Messages to be received (incoming arrows) and sent (outgoing
arrows) for signer d in two subsequent appearances of d.
Formally, we construct a main MPCS protocol specifica-
tion for a signing sequence which is assumed to be given as
part of a contractm as shown in Algorithm 1. The algorithm
loops through every element in the signing sequence. Within
a loop, a particular signer σi’s receive and send actions are
specified. First the receiving of promises and signatures by
the signer is specified and then the sending of promises and
signatures. If this is the last appearance of the signer in the
protocol, it is ensured that the signer sends out signatures
to all other signers to which it has not sent such a signature
yet. Then it is ensured that it waits for all signatures that it
has not received up to that point.
The sending of messages is denoted by the instruction
sendP (Q, t), where P is the sender, Q the recipient and t
the message to be sent. The waiting to receive a message is
denoted by the instruction receiveP (Q, t), where P is the
recipient, Q the sender and t the message to be received.
The instructions for sending and receiving messages do
not commute. Since the algorithm first prints out receive
instructions and then send instructions, it follows that in
each step i, no promise is sent by an honest signer σi to
another signer σj until all promises that are awaited by σi in
that step are received. To prevent endless waiting, a signer σi
has an alternativeRes(m, prev(i)) to the receive instruction.
The Res(m, prev(i)) protocol allows signer σi to contact the
trusted third party in case he has not received all required
messages. The Res(m, i) protocol is formally specified in
Section III-B. In Algorithm 1, we use the symbol ‘+’ to
denote alternative branching.
Every promise sent is annotated with the protocol step
in which it was sent. This annotation is denoted by (m, i),
where m is the contract and i is the protocol step number.
This annotation is analogous to the promise level of previous
works [5], [6].
The set SigSet is the set of positions in σ in which
signers will send their universally verifiable signatures to
other signers. This set needs to be proper (Definition 6)
which ensures that all signers send a signature and that
once a signer has issued a signature, it will continue to
issue signatures, rather than promises. We will typically set
SigSet = rmpi(σ), that is, each signer sends signatures
in its last appearance in the signing sequence. We refer
to Remark 3 in Section V for a class of protocols which
requires a larger SigSet.
The construction of the formal specification of the pro-
tocol is given in Algorithm 1. The input to this algorithm
consists of contract m from which it is possible to extract
the set of signers A, the signing sequence σ and the signing
set SigSet. The algorithm outputs a formal specification of
our MPCS protocol.
Algorithm 1: Main protocol compiler
input : m
output: Main(m)
1 for i ∈ [|σ|] do
2 for j′ ∈ rmpi(σprev(i)+1, . . . , σi−1) do
3 j := prev(i) + j′;
4 if j /∈ SigSet then
5 print
“(receiveσi(σj , PCSσj ((m, j), σi, T ))+
Res(m, prev(i)))”;
6 else
7 print “(receiveσi(σj , Sσj (m))+
Res(m, prev(i)))”;
8 for j′ ∈ lmpi(σi+1, . . . , σnext(i)−1) do
9 j := i+ j′;
10 if i /∈ SigSet then
11 print “sendσi(σj , PCSσi((m, i), σj , T ))”;
12 else
13 print “sendσi(σj , Sσi(m))”;
14 if next(i) = |σ|+ 1 then
15 i0 := min {j ∈ SigSet | σi = σj};
16 for P ∈ A \
{
σi0 , . . . , σ|σ|
}
do
17 print “sendσi(P, Sσi (m))”;
18 for Q ∈ A \ {σj | j ∈ SigSet ∧ j ≤ i} do
19 print “(receiveσi(Q,SQ(m))+Res(m, i))”;
Remark 1. Note that the specification for an individual
signer P ’s protocol role can be obtained from Algorithm 1
by changing the set [|σ|] in line 1 to the set of positions in
which signer P appears in the signing sequence, i.e., the set
{l ∈ [|σ|] | σl = P}.
Example 4. The signing sequence σ = (a, b, c, b, a, b, c, b,
a, b, c) with SigSet = rmpi(σ) generates a three-signer
MPCS protocol of Mukhamedov and Ryan [5] and leads
to the protocol shown in Figure 2. The arrows’ tails and
heads correspond, respectively, to the send and receive
instructions generated by Algorithm 1. The top arrow con-
necting the vertical lines under a and b corresponds, for
instance, to the instructions senda(b, PCSa((m, 1), b, T ))
and receiveb(a, PCSa((m, 1), b, T )). If we change line 1 in
the algorithm according to the preceding remark, we obtain
the receive and send instructions which can be read along
the vertical lines in Figure 2.
a b c
PCSa((m, 1), b, T ) PCSa((m, 1), c, T )
PCSb((m, 2), c, T )
PCSc((m, 3), b, T )PCSc((m, 3), a, T )
PCSb((m, 4), a, T )
PCSa((m, 5), b, T ) PCSa((m, 5), c, T )
PCSb((m, 6), c, T )
PCSc((m, 7), b, T )PCSc((m, 7), a, T )
PCSb((m, 8), a, T )
Sa(m) Sa(m)
Sb(m)Sb(m)
Sc(m)Sc(m)
Figure 2. Protocol generated by Algorithm 1 from signing sequence
(a, b, c, b, a, b, c, b, a, b, c)
1) Correctness: We show that the compiled main pro-
tocol is well-defined and that when all signers are honest,
every signer will receive a fully signed contract. This prop-
erty is independent of whether the signing sequence is fair
or not.
The case where one or more signers deviate from or abort
the protocol is correct in the sense that every honest signer
has the option to run the resolve protocol as an alternative
to the receive instruction after a specific timeout.
Lemma 2. The Main(m) protocol is well-defined. That is,
there is a one-to-one correspondence between sendQ(P, t)
and receiveP (Q, t) instructions and every such send in-
struction precedes the corresponding receive instruction.
Proof: We consider the protocol specification generated
by the two inner for loops of Algorithm 1 separately from
the specification produced by the remainder of the algorithm.
1) The protocol specification generated in lines 2
through 13 is well defined.
We first show inductively that the send instructions
precede the receive instructions. Signer σ1 starts the
protocol by sending promises to other signers. In par-
ticular, σ1 does not wait to receive any messages, since
the condition in line 2 of the protocol specification in
Algorithm 1 specifies an empty sequence and thus the
resulting set is empty.
Signer σi, for 1 < i < |σ|+1, only waits for messages
from signers σj where j < i.
It therefore remains to be shown that there is a
one-to-one correspondence between send and receive
instructions. To show that for every receive instruction
for σi in line 5 (line 7, respectively), there is a corre-
sponding send instruction for σj in line 11 (line 13,
respectively), amounts to showing that for every
j ∈
{
prev(i) + j′ | j′ ∈ rmpi(σprev(i)+1, . . . , σi−1)
}
(2)
there exists
i′ ∈ lmpi(σj+1, . . . , σnext(j)−1)
such that i = j + i′.
This is true, since by (2) and definition of rmpi
we have prev(i) < j < i < next(j). Thus i ∈{
j + i′ | i′ ∈ lmpi(σj+1, . . . , σnext(j)−1)
}
.
The one-to-one correspondence now follows from the
fact that no two send or receive instructions are iden-
tical and that the number of send instructions printed
equals the number of receive instructions printed. The
latter follows from the facts that rmpi and lmpi always
have the same number of elements when applied to the
same sequence and that the two inner for loops range
over the same non-empty sequences.
2) To show that the protocol specification generated in
lines 14–19 is also well defined, we need to prove
that for every receive instruction in line 19 there exists
a corresponding send instruction and for every send
instruction in line 17 there is a corresponding receive
instruction.
Let i be an index such that next(i) = |σ| + 1 and
let Q ∈ A \ {σj | j ∈ SigSet∧ j ≤ i}. According
to specification in line 19, signer σi waits for a
signature from Q. We will show that a corresponding
send by Q is specified in line 17. Since Q ∈ A \
{σj | j ∈ SigSet∧ j ≤ i}, either
a) every position l, such that l ∈ SigSet and σl =
Q, is grater than i, or
b) {l | σl = Q} ∩ SigSet = ∅, i.e., none of the
indexes in SigSet corresponds to signer Q.
Let l0 = min {j ∈ SigSet | Q = σj}. If case 2a
holds, then i < l0. Together with the fact
that next(i) = |σ| + 1 this means that σi ∈
A \
{
σl0 , . . . , σ|σ|
}
. If case 2b holds, then A \{
σl0 , . . . , σ|σ|
}
= A. In both cases, according to
lines 16 and 17, there exists a send instruction
sendQ(σi, SQ(m)).
We now show that for every send instruction in line 17
there exists a corresponding receive instruction in
line 19. Recall that i0 := min {j ∈ SigSet | σi = σj}
in line 15. We still consider i, such that next(i) =
|σ|+1 and we fix P ∈ A\
{
σi0 , . . . , σ|σ|
}
. According
to line 17, signer σi sends his signature to signer P . To
find a corresponding receive instruction for P , we con-
sider the last appearance of P in σ and denote the cor-
responding position by l so that σl = P and next(l) =
|σ|+1. According to lines 18 and 19, it is sufficient to
show that σi ∈ A \ {σj | j ∈ SigSet ∧ j ≤ l}. Since,
P ∈ A \
{
σi0 , . . . , σ|σ|
}
, we know that l < i0 ≤ i.
Therefore, σi 6∈ {σj | j ∈ SigSet ∧ j ≤ l} which is
equivalent to σi ∈ A \ {σj | j ∈ SigSet ∧ j ≤ l}.
Theorem 2. Let σ be a signing sequence over a finite set
A with proper signing set SigSet. If all signers are honest
then every signer P ∈ A receives from every signer Q ∈ A,
Q 6= P , a signature SQ(m).
Proof: Since the protocol is well-defined by Lemma 2,
it remains to be shown that every signer receives a fully
signed contract. Since SigSet is proper, every signer sends
a signature. By lines 16 and 17, every signer who has not
received a signature from σi by the last appearance of σi,
is sent a signature.
B. Resolve Protocol
Our resolve protocol is a two-message protocol in which a
signer who has sent a message in the i-th protocol step sub-
mits evidence supporting the fact that the protocol execution
has reached the i-th step. The TTP stores evidence submitted
by every requesting signer and considers it together with
existing evidence and immediately sends back an abort token
or a signed contract. We denote the TTP by T in the
protocol.
Recall our assumptions that the communication channels
for this protocol are resilient, confidential, and authentic.
Recall further that the contract m is assumed to contain the
contract text, the set A of signers, the signing sequence σ
over A and corresponding signing set SigSet.
For the signers, the resolve protocol depends on the last
protocol step, i, in which the signer to execute the resolve
protocol has sent a message. We will denote the resolve
protocol for this step i by Res(m, i). If a signer has not
sent any messages, we set i = 0. For the TTP, the resolve
protocol is independent of the signing sequence or protocol
step a signer is in. It is the TTP’s decision procedure which
processes the evidence submitted and returns an abort token
or a fully signed contract.
Res(m, i) is the protocol whose two role specifications
are shown in Figures 3 and 4, where the variables are as
follows. Let piσi denote the set of each signer’s most recent
promise or universally verifiable signature received by signer
σi until the i-th step of the protocol. Thus
piσi = {PCSσj ((m, j), σi, T ) |
j ∈ rmpi(σ1, . . . , σi) \ SigSet, σj 6= σi}
∪ {Sσj (m) |
j ∈ rmpi(σ1, . . . , σi) ∩ SigSet, σj 6= σi}
If i = 0, then the set piσi is defined to be empty. History
denotes the following set of signatures:
History = piσi ∪ {PCSσi((m, i), σi, T )} . (3)
The private contract signature PCSσi((m, i), σi, T ) is ex-
plicitly added to the History set, because the set piσi does not
contain any promise of signer σi. This additional promise
serves several purposes. It allows the TTP to extract the
contract m even when piσi is empty. It allows the TTP
to extract the position i at which the signer σi claims to
have received promises or signatures for the last time in
the protocol execution. It also allows the TTP to create a
universally verifiable signature on behalf of signer σi in
cases where σi is the first signer to contact the TTP.
The term decision is either a fully signed contract, i.e. the
set {SP (m) | P ∈ A}, or an abort token which we will
simply denote by “abort” and which we do not assume to
have any further meaning.
sendσi(T, p
i
σi
∪ {PCSσi((m, i), σi, T )})
receiveσi(T, decision)
Figure 3. Signer σi’s role in resolve protocol Res(m, i).
receiveT (P,History)
sendT (P, decisionm)
Figure 4. TTP role in resolve protocol Res(m, i).
For each contract m, the TTP maintains a data structure
consisting of a set of private contract signatures Evidencem,
an index set Im, a set Dishonestm of signers considered to
be dishonest, and a variable decisionm. The sequence σ
and the set of signers A corresponding to the main protocol
are extracted from m. The set Evidencem is the union of
History sets which the TTP receives in the first message
of the resolve protocol. The set of indexes Im is the set
of positions i in σ at which signers executed Res(m, i)
to contact the TTP. Thus, for i ∈ Im, the signer σi has
contacted the TTP claiming to have received the elements
of piσi and sent his promises or signatures, but not received
all expected messages necessary for his subsequent protocol
step, next(i). The variable decisionm is equal to the abort
token or a set of universally verifiable signatures on m,
one by each signer, according to the TTP’s last decision
on whether to issue an abort token or a signed contract.
We will write decisionm = ⊥ if the TTP has not been
contacted by any signer regarding contract m.
The TTP’s decision procedure, shown in Algorithm 2,
works as follows. When the TTP receives a message from
P , the TTP first verifies that the message received is valid
and stores the evidence submitted (lines 1 through 8). The
remainder of the algorithm concerns the detection of sign-
ers who have continued the main protocol execution after
executing the resolve protocol. This part of the algorithm is
similar to the TTP decision procedure of [5] and works as
follows.
• If P has not received a promise from every other signer
in the protocol, that is, if the last position in which P
has sent a message in the protocol is smaller than the
number of signers participating in the protocol (line 9)
then the TTP sends back the last decision made. This
decision is an “abort” token unless the TTP has been
contacted before and decided to send back a signed
contract.
• If P has received a promise from every other signer in
the protocol (lines 12 and up) the TTP is able to create
a signed contract from P ’s evidence. In this case, the
TTP’s decision procedure works as follows.
– If there is a previous decision to send back a signed
contract, then the TTP sends back a signed contract
to P (line 13).
– Else the TTP computes the set of dishonest signers
by adding to it every signer which has carried
out the resolve protocol, but can be seen to have
continued the protocol execution (line 17) based
on the evidence the TTP has collected.
∗ If P is in the set of dishonest signers, an “abort”
token is sent to P .
∗ If at least one signer other than P is honest
(line 21), an “abort” token is sent to P , because
the other signer must have received an abort
token already.
∗ Else P must be the only honest signer that has
contacted the TTP until this point in time and
therefore it is safe to return a signed contract.
1) Correctness: We show that the resolve protocol is
correct in the sense that:
• The protocol Res(m, i) is well-specified. This means
that a signer executing Res(m, i) can generate the
correct evidence and that the TTP has the ability to
verify the correctness of the submitted evidence.
• The TTP can issue signatures whenever his decision is
to resolve rather than to abort the signing protocol.
• No honest signer will be placed in the set Dishonestm.
These properties are independent of whether the signing
sequence is fair or not.
Lemma 3. The protocol Res(m, i) satisfies the following
properties.
Algorithm 2: TTP decision procedure
input : P,History ,m, σ,A, i
output: decisionm
1 if decisionm = ⊥ then
2 Evidencem := ∅; Im = ∅;
3 Dishonestm := ∅; decisionm := “abort”;
4 if P ∈ Dishonestm ∨ ∃j ∈ Im : P = σj ∨ History 6=
piσi ∪ {PCSσi((m, i), P, T )} then
5 Dishonestm := Dishonestm ∪ {P};
6 return “abort”;
7 Im := Im ∪ {i};
8 Evidencem := Evidencem ∪History ;
9 if i < |A| then
10 return decisionm;
11 else
12 if decisionm 6= “abort” then
13 return decisionm;
14 else
15 l := max Im;
16 for j ∈ Im, j < l do
17 if σj ∈ {σj+1, . . . , σl} then
18 Dishonestm := Dishonestm ∪ {σj};
19 if P ∈ Dishonestm then
20 return decisionm;
21 if ∃j ∈ Im : σj /∈ Dishonestm ∧ σj 6= P then
22 return decisionm;
23 else
24 decisionm := {SQ(m) | Q ∈ A};
25 return decisionm;
1) An honest signer executing Res(m, i) has the ability
to generate the set History as defined in equation (3).
2) The TTP can verify the correctness of the set History .
3) The TTP has the ability to generate a fully signed
contract whenever the decision procedure requires him
to do so.
Proof:
1) Clearly a signer P can generate PCSP ((m, i), P, T ).
It remains to show that an honest signer can
generate the set piσi after protocol step i. Note
first that every index j ∈ rmpi(σ1, . . . , σi) such
that σj 6= P = σi is present in one of the sets{
prev(i′) + j′ | j′ ∈ rmpi(σprev(i′)+1, . . . , σi′−1)
}
where 1 ≤ i′ ≤ i and σi′ = σi. Thus, the elements
of piσi are a subset of the messages specified to be
obtained by σi through the receive instructions in the
first inner for loop of Algorithm 1.
By the well-specification of the Main(m) protocol
(Lemma 2), each of these messages must have been
sent prior to the i-th protocol step. Since an honest
signer executes Res(m, i) only after having sent the
messages in the i-th protocol step, it follows that P
must have received all the necessary messages.
2) The TTP can verify whether the set History submitted
satisfies equation (3), as follows. Since the set History
always contains PCSP ((m, i), P, T ), the TTP can
extract the contract m and the claimed protocol step i
from History . The signing sequence can be extracted
from m. Thus the TTP can verify that P = σi, that
is, the signer contacting the TTP is the same as the
signer which is supposed to be in step i. Finally, the
contents of the set piσi can be verified by property 2
of Definition 4.
3) The TTP changes his decision from “abort” to a
fully signed contract only in line 24 of the decision
procedure (Algorithm 2). This line is only reached
when i > |A|, that is when every signer has appeared
in the protocol. Thus, the set History will contain
a promise or signature by every signer participating
in the protocol and the TTP will be able to convert
promises to universally verifiable signatures by prop-
erty 3 of Definition 4.
The following lemma states that no signer can convince
the TTP that the protocol has progressed beyond an honest
signer’s next protocol step. It will be used to show that
honest signers will not be considered to be dishonest by
the TTP.
Lemma 4. Let σ be a signing sequence and Main(m) the
corresponding main contract signing protocol. If an honest
signer σi has not sent any message in the i-th protocol step
of Main(m), then any signer claiming to have reached a
protocol step j > i will have an incorrect History set.
Proof: Since j > i, there exists i′ ∈ rmpi(σ1, . . . , σj)
such that i′ ≥ i and σi′ = σi. Thus the set History needs to
contain a signature by σi at step i
′. The existence of such
a signature contradicts the fact that σi is honest and did not
send any message in the i-th step.
Lemma 5. If signer P is honest in Main(m), then for all
behaviors of signers Q ∈ A, Q 6= P and every run of the
TTP decision procedure, P 6∈ Dishonestm.
Proof: A signer is placed in to the set Dishonestm
as a consequence of lines 4 and 17 in the TTP decision
procedure.
An honest signer will not be placed in Dishonestm as a
consequence of any of the three conditions in line 4, since
Dishonestm is initially empty, an honest signer by definition
quits the protocol execution after contacting the TTP and
sends messages as specified in the protocol. Regarding the
last of the three conditions, by the protocol specification in
Figure 3 and by equation 3, the honest signer sends precisely
the set of messages the TTP expects.
An honest signer will not be placed in Dishonestm as a
consequence of the condition in line 17: If an honest signer
appears in Im, then the signer must have executed the resolve
protocol Res(m, i) for some i ∈ Im. This is because the
only line modifying the set Im is line 7, which is executed as
a consequence of a signer σi contacting the TTP through an
authentic channel and presenting a correct History set. By
definition, an honest signer quits after executing the resolve
protocol and by Lemma 4, no other signer can produce a
correct History set after protocol step i.
IV. PROVING FAIRNESS AND TIMELINESS
We prove fairness of the protocol constructed using the
protocol compiler described in Section III with TTP pro-
cedure shown in Algorithm 2 in three steps, split over
three lemmas. The following lemma expresses that the TTP
decision procedure enforces all but one of the abort chaining
conditions of Definition 7. The subsequent lemma shows that
if an honest signer sends a signature, then the remaining
condition is satisfied, too. This allows us to directly link
fairness of the contract signing protocol in this case to the
fairness property of the signing sequence. The third lemma
deals with the case in which an honest signer has received
an abort token and states that no other signer will receive a
fully signed contract.
The lemmas are combined to prove fairness of the con-
structed MPCS protocol in the subsequent theorem which
also addresses the timeliness property.
Lemma 6. Let m be a contract and σ the contract’s signing
sequence of length n. We have the following invariant in the
TTP’s decision procedure for σ, Im, decisionm:
If decisionm = “abort” and Im 6= ∅ then there exist l
with 0 < l ≤ |Im|, I ⊂ [n], and a bijective, increasing
function f : [l] → I with f(l) = max Im such that condi-
tions 1, 2, 4 of Definition 7 are satisfied for the subsequence
(σf(1), . . . , σf(l)) of σ.
Proof: To distinguish the data structures before and
after a TTP run for contract m, we will write Im, f ,
decisionm for the values before the TTP’s run and I
′
m, f
′,
decision ′m for the values after the run.
Note that decisionm is set to “abort” upon the first run
for contract m. Suppose decisionm = “abort”. If |Im| = 1,
then the TTP decision procedure obviously enforces that
the unique element i ∈ Im satisfies i < |A|. Thus condi-
tions 1, 2, 4 are satisfied for f(1) = i.
Suppose that the conditions are satisfied for Im, f before
a TTP run and suppose that decision ′m = “abort” after the
TTP run. We need to show that there exists f ′ such that the
conditions remain satisfied. If Im = I
′
m, then we set f
′ = f
and there is nothing to be shown. Else, there is a unique
element i ∈ I ′m \ Im that has been added. If i 6= max I
′
m,
then the conditions remain satisfied for the function f ′ = f .
Thus suppose i = max I ′m. By line 4 of the decision
procedure of the TTP, condition 1 remains satisfied, regard-
less of choice of function f ′. Since decision ′m = “abort”,
by line 21, there exists j ∈ I ′m, j 6= i, such that σj 6∈
{σj+1, . . . , σi}. Thus we define f ′(x) = f(x) for all x ∈ [l]
such that f(x) < j. Let x be the maximal element in [l] such
that f(x) < j, then define f ′(x+1) = j and f ′(x+ 2) = i
to obtain a bijective, increasing function f ′ : [x+ 2]→ I ′m.
Since all elements in Im, which are smaller than or equal
to j, are still in the preimage of f ′, condition 2 remains
satisfied.
Condition 4 is satisfied for all elements smaller than j
in the preimage of f ′, because it was satisfied for f . It is
satisfied for j by lines 16, 17 and line 21 and vacuously
satisfied for i.
Lemma 7. Let m be a contract with a fair signing sequence
σ and a proper signing set SigSet. If an honest signer P
sends SP (m) in the main protocol, then P will receive all
signatures.
Proof: Let i be the earliest step in which P has sent a
signature. Since σ is fair, it follows that i > |A|.
Suppose that P does not receive all signatures. Then P
will eventually execute the resolve protocol Res(m, j) for
j ≥ i. Since P is honest, by Lemma 5, P 6∈ Dishonestm
in Algorithm 2. Since j ≥ i > |A| and P 6∈ Dishonestm,
the if conditions in lines 9, 12, 19, 21 of the TTP decision
procedure either lead to a fully signed contract or to an
“abort” token in line 22.
Suppose towards a contradiction that P receives an
“abort” token. By line 21 of the TTP decision procedure,
there must be another signer Q 6∈ Dishonest to whom an
abort token is issued. Thus, by Lemma 6, there exist l ∈ N
and an increasing function f : [l] → I such that f(l) =
max I . Since signer P has sent a signature, condition 3
of Definition 7 is satisfied. By Lemma 6, the subsequence
(σf(1), . . . , σf(l)) of σ satisfies conditions 1, 2, 4, too. This
is a contradiction, since σ is a fair sequence.
The following lemma expresses that if an honest signer
receives an abort token before he reaches a step in the
signing set, then no signer will reach the signing set. More
precisely, any signer contacting the TTP with Res(m, i),
i ∈ SigSet will be considered dishonest. Together with the
fact that no honest signer will be considered dishonest by
the TTP, it follows that only dishonest signers can pretend
to have issued a signature.
Lemma 8. Suppose σ is a fair sequence over A with proper
signing set SigSet. Suppose further that an honest signer P
receives an abort token in Res(m, i) without having sent a
signature SP (m) to any signer. Then no signer will receive
the signature SP (m).
Proof: Let i be the protocol step in which P has
contacted the TTP. Since P has not sent SP (m) and P is
honest, only the TTP could have generated SP (m).
Suppose a signer Q 6= P has contacted the TTP in step
j. By the TTP decision procedure, if j < i, then Q must
receive an abort token, since P has received an abort token.
If j > i, since P is honest, P did not participate in the main
protocol after receiving the abort token. Thus, by Lemma 5,
P 6∈ Dishonestm, therefore Q must receive an abort token.
We are now ready to state and prove our main theorem,
namely that our construction provides fairness for protocols
constructed from fair signing sequences and timeliness for
all signing sequences.
Theorem 3. Let m be a contract with fair signing sequence
σ and proper signing set SigSet. ThenMain(m) as created
by Algorithm 1 and Res(m, i) with the decision procedure
stated in Algorithm 2 constitute an optimistic contract sign-
ing protocol satisfying fairness and timeliness.
Proof:
• Fairness
Suppose the contract signing protocol for m is not
fair for an honest signer P . By Definition 1, there
is a signer Q 6= P who has obtained P ’s universally
verifiable signature SP (m), but P does not have a fully
signed contract. Thus, either P has sent his signature
but has not received all signatures or P has contacted
the TTP and has received an “abort” token. The former
case is impossible by Lemma 7 and the latter case is
impossible by Lemma 8.
• Timeliness
No signer will wait endlessly for another signer, since
it has an option to execute the resolve protocol at
every step in which it waits for a message by another
signer. No signer will wait endlessly for the TTP,
since the communication channel between the TTP
and the signer is assumed to be resilient and the TTP
immediately responds to resolve requests by signers.
V. CONSTRUCTING FAIR PROTOCOLS
By Theorems 1 and 3, to obtain a fair MPCS protocol one
needs to construct a complete sequence and a proper signing
set. We now show how this can be done explicitly and
provide examples of known and novel, fair MPCS protocols.
We first reduce the problem to the construction of com-
plete sequences.
Theorem 4. Let A be a set of signers and τ a complete
sequence over A. Let ρ be a permutation of A \ {τ1}. Then
σ = (ρ, τ) is a fair signing sequence for the signing set
SigSet = rmpi(σ).
Proof: It is easy to see that σ is a signing sequence
with the proper signing set SigSet.
Let l(c), σc be as defined in Theorem 1. Let i ∈ SigSet,
j ∈ rmpi(τ) such that σi = τj . Let c = σi. Since i ∈
SigSet = rmpi(σ), l(c) = i. Thus, σc = (τ1, . . . , τj).
Since τ is a complete sequence over A and j ∈ rmpi(τ),
the sequence σc = (τ1, . . . , τj) is complete over A \ {τj}.
By Theorem 1, σ is a fair sequence.
Thus, to construct a fair protocol, we start with a complete
sequence. We then prepend a permutation of elements in A
to the complete sequence to obtain a signing sequence σ.
We chose the signing set to be rmpi(σ), i.e. the indexes of
the last appearance of every element in A. Then we apply
the protocol compiler.
Constructions for complete sequences over arbitrary finite
sets have been given by Adleman [12], Newey [13], and
Mohanty [14]. They give rise to signing sequences of length
k2 − k + 3.
MR protocols: Let A = {P1, . . . , Pk} be a set of signers.
Then the sequences (P1, . . . , Pk−1, Pk, Pk−1, . . . , P2) con-
catenated ⌈k/2⌉ times and extended by (P1, . . . , Pk) lead to
the protocols proposed by Mukhamedov and Ryan [5]. The
SigSet consists of the last k indexes. Fairness of signing
sequences obtained by this construction can be shown easily.
A sketch of the proof goes as follows. By construction, there
are k− 1 concatenated permutations over A after the initial
permutation and before the elements indexed by SigSet.
Thus, these k − 1 permutations form a complete sequence
over A \ {c}, for every c ∈ A. The number of messages to
be sent in MR protocols, which is related to the bandwidth
complexity discussed in the next section, was computed by
Mukhamedov and Ryan to be k(k − 1)(⌈k/2⌉+ 1).
MRT protocols: The protocols generated in this paper
can be easily modified in such a way that the signers send
only one message in each step of the protocol. Instead of
sending separate promises (or signatures) to several signers,
a signer P = σi sends all promises (or signatures) to the
next signer Q = σi+1 in the signing sequence. Signer Q
then forwards all of P ’s promises (or signatures) to the
subsequent signer, exchanging the promises (or signatures)
intended for Q by promises (or signatures) generated by Q.
This leads to a class of protocols which were investigated
by Mauw et al. [1]. The authors computed a lower bound in
terms of the total number of messages that must be sent in
such protocols for the protocols to be fair. We will refer to
this type of complexity measure as the message complexity
of the generated protocol in the next section. The authors
constructed one shortest possible protocol for three signers.
Zhang et al. [8], [9] give descriptions of more protocols
based on shortest signing sequences to which they refer as
MRT protocols. We thus define an MRT protocol to be the
shortest possible fair MPCS protocol in terms of message
complexity.
The constructions of Adleman [12] and Newey [13]
produce complete sequences of length k2 − 2k + 4. These
are known to be the shortest lengths for complete sequences
when 2 < k < 8, thus they lead via Theorem 4 and our
protocol compiler to MRT protocols for more than 2 and
up to 7 signers. The shortest length for complete sequences
when k ≥ 8 is still open and will be discussed further in
Section VI.
Remark 2. It is interesting to note that with our generaliza-
tion of signing sequences we are able to produce shorter
protocols for certain sequences than is possible with the
original notion of Mauw et al. used by Zhang et al. The
sequences in question are those which neither start nor end
with a permutation of the set of signers. An example can be
constructed from a sequence first described by Newey [13]:
(1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 1, 6, 4, 3, 2, 1, 5, 4, 3,
6, 1, 2, 4, 5, 3, 1, 6, 4, 2, 3, 5, 1, 4)
The sequence shown is a shortest possible sequence over
a set of six elements containing permutations of all six
elements as subsequences. The more restricted definition of a
signing sequence in previous work required, however, that a
signing sequence ends with a permutation. This necessitates
an additional appearance of signer 6 at the end of the
sequence shown above.
Remark 3. Since MRT protocols require promises and sig-
natures to be forwarded rather than sent directly to their
destination, it is necessary to specify in which order the last
signer’s signature is to be forwarded to the other signers.
This can be achieved by appending these |A| − 2 signers
in desired order to a fair signing sequence and adding their
positions in the resulting signing sequence to the SigSet.
Thus, the SigSet contains 2 |A| − 2 elements for contract
signing protocols with message forwarding.
Minimizing the involvement of certain parties: The in-
volvement of one signer in the protocol can be reduced
by increasing the involvement of other parties. This can
be useful if certain signers have a significantly reduced
bandwidth compared with the other signers. In an extreme
case, a fair protocol can be produced in which a signer
sends promises in one step and signatures in a further step,
independent of the number of other signers. This comes,
however, at the cost of almost doubling the number of all
other signers’ steps.
The construction is as follows.
Theorem 5. Let σ = (ρ, τ) be a fair sequence, where ρ is
a permutation of A \ {τ1}. Let s 6∈ A be a signer which is
not in the set A. Then the sequence σ′ = (s, ρ, τ, s, τ) is a
fair sequence over A ∪ {s} for the signing set SigSet =
rmpi(σ′).
The proof of the theorem is standard and therefore omit-
ted.
Example 5. Consider the signing sequence
(a, b, c, a, b, c, a, b, c). The sequence is easily seen to
be a fair signing sequence. By Theorem 5, the sequence
(d, a, b, c, a, b, c, a, b, c, d, c, a, b, c, a, b, c) is a fair
signing sequence.
VI. COMPLEXITY
There are several common complexity measures for asyn-
chronous, optimistic MPCS protocols, but no common ter-
minology for these measures. One measure is in terms of
the total number of messages sent in the optimistic case,
when assuming that at each protocol step only one message
containing several promises is forwarded to the next signer
such as described for the MRT protocols in the previous
section. We call this measure message complexity.
The other measure concerns the bandwidth necessary
to execute the protocol in the optimistic case. Since our
protocol compiler produces a specification in which every
message sent contains exactly one private contract signa-
ture or one universally verifiable signature, the bandwidth
complexity can be defined in terms of the total number of
send instructions produced by our protocol compiler. We
will denote the bandwidth of the compiled protocol for σ by
B(σ, SigSet) and define it to be equal to the number of send
instructions appearing in the main protocol specification.
It is known [6] that the minimum message complexity
for k signers is O(k2) and that the minimum bandwidth
complexity is O(k3). The connection between fair MPCS
protocols and fair sequences allows us, however, to give
more precise bounds.
A further measure commonly used is the round com-
plexity [5], [11]. This measure does not have a natural
definition for the protocols constructed in this paper, because
it assumes the existence of a repeating structure in the
protocols.
A. Message complexity
Let λ(k) be the length of the shortest complete sequence
over a set A with |A| = k. It follows from Theorems 1
and 4 that the minimum message complexity of our MPCS
protocols is equal to λ(k) + 2k − 3 and that this bound is
tight. The term 2k−3 stems from the k−1 signers added to
a minimal-length complete sequence for the initial promises
in the beginning of the protocol and k − 2 signers for the
forwarded delivery of the last signer’s signature in the end.
It is easy to see that λ(2) = 3. Newey has shown that for
k > 2, λ(k) ≤ k2 − 2k + 4 with equality for 2 < k < 8.
Za˘linescu [15] has shown λ(k) ≤ k2−2k+3 for k ≥ 10. The
presently best known bound to us is λ(k) ≤ ⌈k2− 73k+
19
3 ⌉
for k ≥ 7 shown by Radomirovic´ [16]. This bound matches
the preceding ones for 7 ≤ k < 13, but is smaller for k ≥ 13.
The following is an example sequence for a set of 13
elements, A = 0, . . . , 9, a, x, y, matching the currently best
known bound. For ease of reading, we do not separate the
elements of this sequence by a comma.
x 0123456789a yx 0123456789a xy 0123456789 x
a01234567y8 x 9a01234567 x 8y9a0123456 x
789a01234y5 x 6789a01234 x 5y6789a0123 x
456789a012 yx 3456789a012 xy 3456789a012 x
B. Bandwidth complexity
While we do not know the precise minimum message
complexity of fair MPCS protocols involving k ≥ 8 signers,
we know that it is equal to λ(k)+2k−3, where λ(k) is the
subject of a well-known open combinatorial problem. The
situation for the precise bandwidth complexity is worse.
A simple upper bound for the minimal bandwidth com-
plexity of fair signing sequences is (λ(k) + 2k− 3)(k− 1).
This bound is obtained by taking the minimal message
complexity of fair MPCS protocols and assuming that in
every step of the protocol every signer sends a signature to
every other signer. The MR protocols of Section V provide
a better bound: k(k− 1)(⌈k/2⌉+1). This is due to the fact
that in MR protocols an average of k/2 send instructions are
specified in a protocol step, whereas the upper bound above
assumes k − 1 instructions.
By computing the bandwidth for all possible fair
signing sequences over 3 and 4 signers, one learns
that the signing sequences (3, 2, 1, 2, 1, 3, 1, 2, 1) and
(4, 3, 2, 1, 2, 1, 3, 1, 2, 1, 4, 1, 2, 1, 3, 1, 2, 1) have minimal
bandwidth with 14 and 34 signatures, respectively. One rec-
ognizes in these sequences the longest fair signing sequences
with the property that removing any element yields an unfair
signing sequence. Such sequences are obtained as follows.
The complete part of the sequence is constructed recursively:
σ1 = (1), σk+1 = (σk, k + 1, σk). Completeness is proven
as follows. σ1 is complete over {1}. If σk is complete, then
σk+1 is complete, because it contains all permutations over
[k] before as well as after the unique appearance of k + 1.
Thus it contains all permutations over [k + 1]. To finally
obtain the fair signing sequence, we prepend (k, . . . , 2) to
σk. The SigSetk is rmpi(σk).
The bandwidth complexity of these protocols can be
bounded below by B(σk, SigSetk) ≥ 3 · 2k−1 − 2k. It
follows that for sufficiently many signers (say k > 10) the
bandwidth complexity of this type of sequences is vastly
larger than the bandwidth complexity of MR protocols.
To derive the bound, note that the number s(k) of send
instructions in the recursively constructed complete part of
the signing sequences satisfies s(2) > 2 and s(k + 1) ≥
2s(k) + 2k− 2. Thus, let b(x) be a function which satisfies
b(2) = 2 and b(x+ 1) = 2 · b(x) + 2x− 2. Then it is easy
to see that b(x) = 3 · 2x−1 − 2x.
The construction of minimal bandwidth fair MPCS pro-
tocols in general is an open problem.
A general result we can prove is that in order to find
a minimal bandwidth fair MPCS protocol, it suffices to
consider only fair signing sequences σ with the property
that removing any element from σ yields an unfair signing
sequence.
Theorem 6. Let ρ, τ be sequences over A such that their
concatenation σ = (ρ, τ) is a signing sequence over A. Then
B(σ, SigSet) ≤ B((ρ, c, τ), SigSet′) for any c ∈ A, where
SigSet′ is obtained from SigSet by shifting positions and
adding the position of c to SigSet′, if necessary.
Proof: It suffices to consider send instructions in the
protocol specification for (ρ, τ) which connect a position in
ρ to a position in τ and involve c as sender or recipient.
Every such instruction will be replaced by an instruction
originating or ending at the newly introduced c in the
specification for (ρ, c, τ). Thus, there will be at least as many
send instructions in the protocol specification for (ρ, c, τ) as
in the protocol specification for (ρ, τ).
While the proof above establishes that the bandwidth
complexity will be no smaller by introducing a new element
into the signing sequence, it is easy to see that it can
be strictly larger. Consider, for instance, the sequences
(c, a, b, a, c) and (c, a, b, c, a, c). The former sequence has
four send instructions involving c while the latter has six.
VII. GENERALIZATIONS
Our theory extends to the case where fewer dishonest
signers can be tolerated in exchange for shorter protocols.
We merely give a brief account of this fact.
The controlled reduction in the number of dishonest
signers is achieved by requiring that all permutations of t-
element subsets of A are present in the sequences, rather
than all permutations of A. The protocol compiler then
produces sequences which can tolerate up to t−1 dishonest
signers.
We say that a sequence is t-complete over A, if it contains
all t-element permutations of elements in A as subsequences.
For instance, the sequence (1, 2, 3, 4, 3, 2, 1) is 2-complete
over {1, 2, 3, 4}, since it contains (i, j) as a subsequence
for all i, j ∈ A. Therefore, the protocol compiler applied
to σ = (4, 3, 2, 1, 2, 3, 4, 3, 2, 1) with signing set rmpi(σ)
produces a fair MPCS protocol, as long as there are fewer
than 2 dishonest signers.
Similarly, the sequence (1, 2, 3, 4, 3, 2, 1, 2, 3, 4) is 3-
complete over A, thus σ′ = (4, 3, 2, 1, 2, 3, 4, 3, 2, 1, 2, 3, 4)
with signing set rmpi(σ′) produces a fair MPCS protocol,
as long as there are fewer than 3 dishonest signers. A
construction for short t-complete sequences has been given
by Savage [17].
A closer inspection of our theory reveals that we can give
an even more precise characterization of the set of dishonest
signers that can be tolerated. Consider the signing sequence
σ = (4, 3, 2, 1, 2, 3, 4, 3, 2, 1) again. The sequence is fair
for signers 2, 3, 4 as long as there is at most one dishonest
signer. This is because, using notation of Theorem 1, σ2, σ3,
and σ4 are 1-complete over A \ {2}, A \ {3}, and A \ {4},
respectively. But for signer 1 the sequence is fair as long
as there are at most two dishonest signers, because σ1 is
2-complete over A \ {1}.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We have demonstrated a procedure which allows for a
flexible construction of fair optimistic MPCS protocols and
we have given several examples and starting points for such
constructions. We have proven our construction to be correct
and we have investigated the minimum complexity of the
generated protocols for two types of complexity measures.
At the heart of our construction lies the generation of
sequences which contains all permutations of a finite set as
subsequences. This connection has first been noticed in [1]
where it has been used to prove a lower bound for the
message complexity of fair MPCS protocols. Our results
not only confirm the existence of fair protocols with the
minimum message complexities established in that prior
work, but also show a tighter correspondence between fair
optimistic MPCS protocols and sequences which contain
all permutations of the signers’ set as subsequences. This
improvement is due to our generalized notion of fair signing
sequences.
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